The plaintiff alleged that he was physically abused by staff members of a
private school specializing in the treatment and education of juvenile sex
offenders.

The school and its staff did not engage in state action, since the
plaintiff's placement in it was not mandated by any court order and was
done with the plaintiff's mother's consent. Receipt of government funds
and subjection to a detailed contract with a state agency are not
sufficient to create state action. Nor did the school perform a function
that has been "traditionally the exclusive province of the state"; the only
schools performing the relevant function are private. The fact that state
law required the agency to provide those services did not create state
action. The court distinguishes cases involving prisoners and the civilly
committed, since his legal guardian, the agency, initiated the placement,
and his mother consented. Milonas v. Williams is partly distinguished on
the ground that some commitments in that cases were involuntary, and
otherwise rejected.

The district court properly excluded several incidents of abusive treatment
of students by staff (like holding a student over a balcony railing),
notwithstanding plaintiff's claim that they were offered to show a lax
attitude by the ...

In litigation against the operator of a notorious private immigration
facility (one certified class action and two individual actions which
appear to have multiple plaintiffs), the class members were so difficult to
locate that the court questions whether the case can proceed as a class
action, or whether "new and creative ways of settling the case may have to
be devised to give recognition to the interests of the entire class of
1,625 people." Meanwhile, assuming that the class action will continue as
such, the period for opting out must be extended in fairness to the
plaintiffs in the other actions given the difficulty of notice and
communication. See: DaSilva v. Esmor Correctional Services Inc., 215 F.R.D.
477 (D.N.J. 2003).

The operator of a community corrections center challenged the Department of
Justice's policy change barring persons sentenced to prison from being
placed in a community corrections center except near the end of their
sentences. The operator lacked prudential standing to raise the argument
because it was not within the zone of interests protected by the statute
giving the Bureau of Prisons discretion to select where prisoners serve
their sentences. See: Dismas Charities, Inc. v. United States Dep't of
Justice, Federal Bureau of Prisons, 287 F.Supp.2d 741 (W.D.Ky. 2003).

Here the Sixth Circuit's "exhaust per defendant" rule is turned into a
heightened pleading requirement. At 943:

In his fifth objection, Plaintiff argues that Defendant Correctional
Medical Services was named throughout all stages of the grievance process.
However, the court finds that Plaintiff did not name Correctional Medical
Services in his Step 1 grievance. In his Step 1 grievance, Plaintiff
consistently grieves the conduct of Defendants Debruyn and King throughout
his description of his complaints. Plaintiff makes no mention of
Correctional Medical Services in Step I of his grievance until the final
paragraph where he states: "Should this matter not be resolved and I become
subject to foot Amputation, Nurse King, Health Manager Susan Debruyn,
Health Care and CMS will be liable in a large monetary damages."
Plaintiff's mention of Defendant CMS, however, is not done "against the
person or persons he ultimately seeks to sue." Curry, 249 F.3d at 505.
Simply listing the parties that Plaintiff will sue if the matter is not
resolved and if Plaintiff undergoes further injury, does not name an
individual responsible for an alleged injury in the grievance procedure.
Nor is it sufficient to establish what action or inaction taken by CMS is
being ...

The plaintiff sued over the decedent's death in jail. A nurse, a doctor,
and a private medical provider moved for a more definitive (sic) statement,
asserting that language in the complaint such as "inter alia" and "is not
limited to" is "impermissibly vague." The court says they they meet the
Federal Rules' notice pleading standards. The plaintiffs were not required
to plead "separate causes of action against each of" the defendants under
Rule 8(e)(2), which allows pleading in the alternative and pleading of
multiple claims regardless of consistency. (This holding stands in a murky
relation to defendants' murky argument.) Further, Rule 10(b), though it
requires that separate claims be stated in separate counts in the
complaint, does not require separate statements just because there are
multiple defendants. At 721: "Where the essence of the complaint against
multiple defendants is a scheme, plan or course of conduct, Fed.R.Civ.P.
10(b) does not require that each claim against each defendant be stated
separately merely because all of the defendants may not be involved in each
transaction or occurrence."

The defendants also moved to strike the language in the complaint alleging
deliberate indifference, intent, and willfulness, and therefore the claim
for punitive damages, on ...

Compensation to an expert for time spent in responding to discovery
includes a reasonable amount of time preparing for a deposition. Here, 3.5
hours was reasonable for a review of medical records more than a year after
the expert prepared his report (no details on the case itself). Time
conferring with counsel is not included. The rate for this work is cut
from $500 an hour (the expert's rate for being deposed) to $200. See: Boos
v. Prison Health Services, 212 F.R.D. 578 (D.Kan. 2002).

On July 5, 2001, the Court of Appeals of Georgia Upheld a trial court's
$600,000 award to Stephanie Stitt, a former state prisoner, who suffered
permanent nerve damage as a result of Correctional Medical Service's (CMS)
egregiously inadequate treatment of her condition. The appeals court also
held that the trial ...

The plaintiff complained about events at a jail that was constructed by a
municipality under state law authorization to provide the U.S. Marshals
Service with space for federal pre-trial detainees.

The plaintiff initially sued the Detention Facility, which is a building,
rather than the Cornell Corrections Corp. The court concludes that his
proposed amendment to name the corporation relates back to the filing of
the original complaint, since the corporation had sufficient constructive
notice that it would have been sued save for a mistake. The complaint was
served on the jail; service was accepted by an employee of the corporation.
The complaint indicated that the plaintiff meant to sue whoever was in
charge at the jail. The corporation had constructive notice because they
share the same attorney as the original defendants. They have failed to
show that they would be prejudiced by now defending against the plaintiff's
claims. Given the leniency accorded to pro se complaints, the plaintiff
should be relieved from his mistake. The court distinguishes cases where
the plaintiff simply didn't know the identity of the proper party, which
doesn't qualify as a mistake.

The plaintiff's claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 are dismissed because there
is no ...

The court disposes of summary judgment motions in 15 consolidated cases
concerning medical care provided by Correctional Medical Services at East
Jersey State Prison. The court grants summary judgment against nine of
them (mostly because the prisoners got a reasonable amount of attention, or
because they don't show any harm) and denies it at least in part in the
other six cases in a fact-heavy 48-page opinion.

The court notes that plaintiffs can recover against the corporate medical
provider only upon a showing of corporate policy or custom, then notes
evidence in the form of memos between CMS and DOC expressing concern about
CMS's failure promptly to provide vital medication, the difficulty of
getting appointments with primary physicians, the difficulty of getting
specialist referrals, and the failure adequately to maintain medical
records. The court notes that the surviving plaintiffs (surviving legally,
that is) all complain of these problems, and that a jury could find the
failure of CMS to take affirmative steps to deal with them created a
sufficiently obvious risk as to constitute deliberate indifference. (739)
Highlights of individual cases:

The failure to send an elevated PSA test on three occasions when the
plaintiff was sent to an oncologist, ...

The plaintiff physician complained that she was fired by a private
corporation providing medical care to prisoners because she gave a prisoner
a 7-Up to drink. Prison officials denied her further access to the prison
and the corporation cited that fact in firing her. She sued on the ground
that she had been defamed, could not find comparable employment, and should
have had the opportunity for a name-clearing hearing.

The plaintiff loses because she was not a state employee, since the prison
authorities did not control the performance of her duties. There is no
exploration of whether she acted under color of law by virtue of her
position and the contract with the prison system, because the plaintiff
asserted throughout the case that the issue was whether she was a state
employee. See: Hojnacki v. Klein-Acosta, 285 F.3d 544 (7th Cir. 2002).