The plaintiff challenged his transfer to an out-of-state prison. At 974:
". . . [A] prisoner has no liberty interest in avoiding transfer to another
prison, be it out-of-state, more restrictive, or owned and run by a private
corporation."

The transfer does not amount to cruel and unusual punishment by reason of
its effect on family visiting. At 975: "In this age of reasonably
affordable (and speedy) interstate travel [let them eat cake!], the Court
has to assume that Berdine's exile in Tennessee, even if it lasts until his
mandatory release date in 2041, does not represent a 'total' denial of
visitation privileges." See: Berdine v. Sullivan, 161 F.Supp.2d 972
(E.D.Wis. 2001).

The plaintiff saw a specialist who said he needed a bone graft procedure
immediately, and the prison doctor defendant recommended that he get it.
Nine months later, the same specialist said there was no need for further
evaluation or surgery, and the prison doctor concurred. The prison doctor
could not be held liable absent evidence that he was involved in delaying
surgery. Exactly what was going on in this case is not made clear.

The plaintiff offered a report by Correctional Medical Services to support
a claim of liability against CMS, but there was nothing in it supporting a
claim for delay of surgery, so it is irrelevant. See: Palermo v.
Correctional Medical Services, Inc., 148 F.Supp.2d 1340 (S.D.Fla. 2001).

In 1999, Kyle Bell was tried and convicted of the 1993 murder of Jeanna
North by the state of North Dakota. Transcor America Inc., a private prison
transportation company, was contracted by the state of North Dakota to
transport Bell to a maximum security prison in Oregon. Bell escaped. The
North family alleges negligence and negligent infliction of emotional
distress for allowing the escape.

Transcor moved for judgment on the pleadings. Transcor argues that they
had no legal duty to the North family for the negligence claim and the
North family was not in the zone of danger nor was there a duty of care
owed for the negligent infliction of emotional distress claim. The
custodian or supervisor of a prisoner has a general duty to the public;
however, there must be a special relationship between the parties
distinguishing them from the general public for Transcor to be held liable.
Transcor had no such relationship. The North family further argues that
they were a third party beneficiary to the contract between Transcor and
the State, yet the third party must have been intended to benefit from the
contract, which was not the case. The family did not plead breach of ...

The plaintiff, who had had repeated shoulder surgery, reinjured his shoulder in jail. He got an x-ray but no treatment except pain killers and referrals to mental health. After release, he had to have two additional surgeries on his shoulder.

A private medical care provider (EMSA in this case) is not a municipality, and punitive damages may be assessed against it. The policy reasons against punitive damage awards to municipalities don't apply, and the plaintiff needn't show that he was injured as a result of a corporate policy. (The latter conclusion is contrary to every prior decision I've seen on the point, none of which are cited.) The delays in care experienced by the plaintiff might show deliberate indifference on EMSA's part; the court appears to be applying respondeat superior but doesn't say so. See: Segler v. Clark County, 142 F.Supp.2d 1264 (D.Nev. 2001).

An investigative reporter published an article critical of the defendants; they responded; the plaintiff
sued them for defamation and interference in his business interests. Their statement that he
employed objectionable newsgathering techniques was not defamatory per se; nor was the
statement that reporters may have been used to unspecified plaintiffs' lawyers to generate bad
publicity; statements that the reporters' thesis was flawed, their statements inaccurate, their tone
sensationalistic was non-actionable opinion. See: Skolnick v. Correctional Medical Services, Inc., 132 F.Supp.2d 1116 (N.D.Ill. 2001).

A consent decree between Medicaid patients and the state is binding as a matter of due process upon HMO's who were agents of the state and contracted with it, where their contracts acknowledged that additional appeal process guidelines might be developed and the contractors would follow them, and that the contractors must follow the relevant grievance process. Under Rule 65(d), Fed.R.Civ.P., governing injunctions, the HMO's are bound because they are agents of the state by virtue of their contracts.

Non-class members lack standing to object to a failure to give notice of the settlement to class members.

The objecting non-class members were entitled to be heard at a fairness hearing (which the district court did not hold). However, the hearing to be held on remand need not "entail the entire panoply of protections afforded by a full-blown trial on the merits." See: Tennessee Ass'n of Health Maintenance Organizations, Inc. v. Grier, 262 F.3d 559 (6th Cir. 2001).

The plaintiff complained about his medical care, reciting a long and
tortured history of his treatment and non-treatment for Hepatitis A, B, and
C, and rheumatoid arthritis that may or may not have been caused by it.

The court notes that a month after plaintiff filed suit, it ordered
Correctional Medical Services to arrange for him to be examined by two
independent doctors, who were to address the questions whether the
plaintiff had rheumatoid arthritis, and if so what should be done about it,
and whether his hepatitis C had advanced to the point where interferon
treatment was appropriate (404-05, 411).

The court declines to appoint counsel since, although the plaintiff has a
colorable Eighth Amendment claim, his chances of success are too low; at
most he has shown malpractice. The plaintiff has received legal training
in prison, has earned a paralegal/legal assistant certificate, and serves
as a prison law library clerk. He hasn't experienced difficulty getting
discovery and he has demonstrated competence in dealing with opposing
counsel and the court. The law is straightforward and medical files are
readily available. The case is not likely to turn on credibility
determinations. The need for expert testimony has been satisfied by ...

At police direction, a private corporation transported the plaintiff to a
police station, where he collapsed from a medication overdose. He had
taken 114 pills after arrest while the officers stood around talking. When
asked about the empty bottle, he admitted taking them and asked to go to a
hospital. The police told him he would get medical care at the county
jail. After he collapsed in the police station, he was unconscious for
three days.

Medi-Car and its personnel were entitled to summary judgment. The driver
had no authority over the Police Department's detainees and could not
release the plaintiff or remove his restraints. The corporation was not
expected to render medical services to prisoners (and did not do so for
anyone else it transported). In any case the driver did not have actual
knowledge of any serious medical need because the plaintiff's condition did
not deteriorate until he got to the police station.

A private corporation is not vicariously liable for its employees'
deprivations of civil rights. At 766: "For purposes of § 1983, we have
treated a private corporation acting under color of state law as though it
were a municipal entity." See: Jackson v. Illinois Medi-Car, ...

The plaintiff complained that he did not get adequate HIV treatment in the
District of Columbia system because the Federal Bureau of Prisons failed to
transfer his medical records (though they did send a piece of paper saying
he was to take AZT every four hours and he required blood and bodily fluid
precautions). In the D.C. system, he says, he received no treatment from
1990 to 1998, when his HIV status was "rediscovered" (meanwhile, he
couldn't tell anybody because of his dementia and depression).

The plaintiff's claim against the Bureau of Prisons is barred for failure
to present it to the agency within two years. There is no § 1983 claim
against the Bureau of Prisons because federal officials do not act under
color of state law. The court does not construe his claim as a Bivens
claim, apparently because he did not plead it against individuals in their
personal capacity.

The plaintiff's claim against the Corrections Corporation of America is
barred because recovery against a corporation requires a showing of
corporate policy and there are no such allegations in the complaint. The
same applies to his claim against the District of Columbia. See: Gabriel v.
Corrections Corporation of ...

The decedent committed suicide in prison.

The court refuses to draw an adverse inference against the medical
defendants from missing records because almost all of them were from a
period later than when they had any dealings with the decedent, and the
exception, a treatment plan, has been the subject of testimony.

The court grants summary judgment to the medical defendants on the ground
that none of them were shown to be deliberately indifferent. Plaintiffs
argued that the sharp drop-off in care provided the decedent in the weeks
before his suicide, combined with evidence of a meeting at which it was
agreed that he was becoming time consuming, was very ill, etc., all despite
his heavy medication, and at which no treatment plan was discussed,
supported a theory that his care was scaled down for financial and
administrative reasons by the private medical provider. The court declines
to draw the suggested inference and says that there is no evidence to
support this theory. See: Pelletier v. Magnusson, 201 F.Supp.2d 148 (D.Me.
2002).