RULE 26(a) EXPERT DISCLOSURE OF
MANUEL D. ROMERO
[ PRELIMINARY REPORT ]
I.

NAME AND ADDRESS OF EXPERT
Manuel D. Romero
1607 Ben San Ave.
Belen, New Mexico 87002

II.

INTRODUCTION
I have been retained by Plaintiff’s Counsel in the case of Rudy Lujan vs.

Corrections Corporation of America (CCA) et al., Plaintiff’s Counsel requested that I
review documents and other evidence produced for this case and provide my opinion, as
a corrections expert, as to the merits of Plaintiff’s claims – and more specifically:
1. What reasonable steps could Corrections Corporation of America (CCA) have
taken to prevent the July 20, 2004 Crowley County Corrections Facility riot?
2. What reasonable steps could CCA have taken to prevent the disturbance from
becoming a riot?
3. What reasonable steps could CCA have taken to prevent the assault and injuries
sustained by Rudy Lujan during the riot?
4. Were any of the Defendants were deliberately indifferent to Rudy Lujan’s safety,
welfare and need for protection?
5. Does any of the Defendant’s conduct in the failure to prevent the riot constitute
deliberate indifference to the health, safety and protection of the inmates,
including Rudy Lujan?
I had previously rendered a report concerning the Crowley County Correctional
Facility on July 18, 2005 that Corrections Corporation of America was negligent and

their negligence was a cause of the riot. I also indicated that CCA was negligent in not
controlling the disturbance before it became a widespread riot.
III.

PROFESSIONAL QUALIFICATIONS
I have attached as Exhibit A a copy of my Curriculum Vitae. The following is a

brief summary of my education and experience in the criminal justice field. I possess an
Associates Degree in Correctional Studies and a Bachelor of Arts in Criminal Justice
from the University of New Mexico in Albuquerque, New Mexico. I have been working
in the criminal justice field for twenty-five years. I have substantial hands-on experience
as a correctional administrator and a jail and prison auditor. I commenced my career in
the corrections field as a correctional officer and progressed through the ranks to the level
of Deputy Secretary of Operations with the New Mexico Corrections Department. I also
served as a deputy court monitor in the United States District of Puerto Rico.

I have

intimate knowledge and experience in prison operations, administration and programs. I
serve as a consultant to the Special Litigation Section of the Civil Rights Division and the
United States Marshals Service both of the United States Department of Justice. My
work with the Civil Rights Division involves inspections related to the Civil Rights of
Institutionalized Persons Act 42U.S.C.S1997 (“CRIPA”) primarily in the area of staff and
inmate safety and security matters. My work with the United States Marshals Service has
been in connection with conducting facility operational assessments. I have inspected a
total of seven (7) facilities (some of which have several sub units) for these two entities
and have inspected some of those facilities several times.
I also served as an expert in conducting conditions of confinement reviews for
Pricewaterhouse Coopers (currently IBM Global Services Business Unit). These reviews

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Manuel D. Romero
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were pursuant to contracts with the United States Department of Justice concerning nonfederal facilities that housed United States Marshals Service and Immigration and
Naturalization detainees. The conditions of confinement reviews included several core
detention standards for jails. I participated in conducting approximately nineteen (19)
conditions of confinement reviews of jails across America.

I was also an active

participant in the revision of the Conditions of Confinement Review Standards with a
final presentation made to the Office of the Federal Detention Trustee and the U.S.
Marshal’s Service in Washington, D.C.
Currently, I continue to work as a corrections consultant and am the President of
Manuel D. Romero Inc., located in the town of Belen, in the State of New Mexico.
IV.

TESTIMONY AT TRIAL, DEPOSITIONS AND AFFIDAVITS
A listing of the cases I have been involved in may be found at pages 15 - 18 of my

Curriculum Vitae, attached hereto as Exhibit A.
V.

COMPENSATION
My fee for this case is $200.00 per hour for document review, report writing and

facility visits. My fee for testimony at trial or depositions is $300 per hour. In addition
to these fees is reimbursement for reasonable expenses.
VI.

PUBLICATIONS

Contributor, Correctional Health Care: Guidelines for the Management of an
Adequate Delivery System (2001)
Contributor, Guidelines for the Development of a Security Program, Second
Edition, American Correctional Association (1997)

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Manuel D. Romero
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VII. INFORMATION AND DATA CONSIDERED IN FORMING OPINIONS
The materials I reviewed and analyzed in preparation for this report consisted of
the following, but not necessarily limited to:
1. Colorado Department of Corrections After Action Report, Inmate Riot: Crowley
County Correctional Facility, July 20, 2004, report dated October 1, 2004
2. American Correctional Standards for Adult Correctional Facilities, 3rd and 4th
Editions and 2004 Standards Supplement
3. Report of The State Auditor – Private Prisons Department of Corrections –
Performance Audit April 2005
4. Deposition and deposition outline of Jamie Munoz, taken 6/26/06
5. Deposition and deposition outline of James I. Hale, taken 6/27/06
6. Deposition and deposition outline of Valerie L. Arguello, taken 6/27/06
7. Deposition and deposition outline of Edward R. Fish, taken 6/28/06
8. Deposition and deposition outline of Wanona Wike, taken 6/27/06
9. Deposition and deposition outline of Raymond Romero, taken 6/26/06
10. Deposition and deposition outline of Robert J. Griffith, taken 6/27/06
11. Deposition and deposition outline of Judy Brizendine, taken 6/28/06
12. Deposition and deposition outline of Misty Stewart, taken 8/17/06
13. Deposition and deposition outline of Richard Selman, taken 8/17/06
14. Deposition and deposition outline of Brent Crouse, taken 8/16/06
15. Deposition and deposition outline of Danny Chavez, taken 8/18/06
16. Deposition and deposition outline of Rudy Lujan, taken 8/15/06
17. Deposition and deposition outline of Richard Bachicha, taken 8/17/06
18. Deposition and deposition outline of Chad Kastelic, taken 8/17/06
19. Deposition and deposition outline of Virginia Lewis, taken 8/17/06
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20. Exhibits 1 through 52, with the exception of Exhibit 50
21. The Shift Supervisor’s Daily Report for the day shift on 7/20/04, and bate
stamped CCA-LUJAN 000468-69
22. Private Prison Monitoring Unit (PPMU) memorandum written on 8/12/04 from
the Colorado Department of Corrections Inspector General’s report of the
Crowley County Correctional Facility Riot, CI #04-000898, and bate stamped
002278-80
23. Preliminary Incident/Situation Notification Report from Exhibit FF of the
Colorado Department of Corrections Inspector General’s report of the Crowley
County Correctional Facility Riot, and bate stamped 002029-31
24. Report of Plaintiff’s Expert, Manuel D. Romero dated July 18, 2005 regarding the
Crowley County Correctional Facility

INTRODUCTION
Rudy Lujan was an inmate incarcerated at the Crowley County Correctional
Facility (CCCF) on or about July 20, 2004. Rudy Lujan arrived at CCCF in early March
2004. Rudy Lujan is a Colorado state inmate who was serving his sentence at CCCF.
CCCF is a private correctional facility under contract with Crowley County pursuant to a
contract entered into between Crowley County and the State of Colorado for the use of
and benefit of the Colorado Department of Corrections. CCCF is owned and operated by
Corrections Corporation of America (CCA) a for-profit private corporation.
During Rudy Lujan’s history of incarceration, he has been a gang member;
however, at some point disassociated himself from gang membership.

Almost

immediately upon his arrival to CCCF, Rudy Lujan started experiencing problems with
other inmates. Rudy Lujan alleges in his complaint that he was harassed, threatened, and
assaulted by other inmates on several occasions while incarcerated at CCCF. Rudy Lujan
alleges, among many other allegations, that he sought help from various CCA officials
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for a safe environment but it was not provided. On July 20, 2004, CCF experienced a
major riot that resulted in serious injury to several inmates, including Rudy Lujan and
substantial property damage to the facility. During the riot, Rudy Lujan was targeted by
other inmates and was severely beaten. Rioting inmates were able to gain access to his
living unit due to a variety of operational breakdowns before the riot and during the riot.
This report will address five (5) opinions regarding Rudy Lujan’s Complaint, as follows.
OPINIONS
1. Reasonable steps CCA could have taken to prevent the riot.
CCA could have taken a number of reasonable steps to prevent the July 20, 2004
riot. Among some of the more obvious steps are to have been proactive (the CCA
management) in better preparing for the arrival of inmates from other states. This would
have included measures such as ensuring that there were no disparities or minimal
disparities among the Wyoming, Washington and Colorado inmates who were housed at
CCCF, in terms of services provided. The facility, although under a different private
operator, had previously experienced a riot in the facility and CCA management could
have learned or gleaned operational insight as to causation factors of that riot.
CCA could have ensured and enforced that Canteen Corporation (the facility food
services vendor) was operating the kitchen at an acceptable level of operation. Evidence
in this case suggests that there were problems with food services such as: having too
many menu substitutions, poor menu planning, complaints and criticisms by staff and
inmates about food quality and quantity. More notable in this area is the lack of evidence
that CCA did anything to address the alleged issues and concerns, thus, inmates became
frustrated.

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The evidence in this case also suggests that salaries of CCA correctional officers
was inferior to that of the Colorado Department of Corrections. The entry level for CCA
correctional officers is $23,000 per year and for Colorado Department of Corrections
correctional officers annual pay starts at $35,000. This disparity in salary contributes to a
high turnover rate and the inability of CCA to attract and maintain quality employees.
Also, it contributes to having a large number of inexperienced correctional officers force
at the facility. Inferior security staffing levels at CCCF were identified by Colorado
Department of Corrections officials in the course of their investigation of the July 20,
2004 Crowley prison riot and in the Report of The State Auditor – Private Prisons
Department of Corrections – Performance Audit April 2005.
The “warning signs” of inmate unrest and a possible disturbance were abundantly
made by staff and inmates to CCA management weeks prior to the riot and on the day of
the riot and no proactive measures were taken to deal with them by CCA management.
Complaints or concerns expressed by CCA line staff and inmates was ignored and
dismissed as rumors by CCA managers. If CCA management would have taken these
warning signs more seriously and investigated them they could have reduced inmate
tension and frustration.
The Colorado State Auditor in the Performance Audit of April 2005 noted a litany
of deficiencies with the private prison vendors, and in particular, referenced that the
Colorado Department of Corrections was not fully staffed prior to the riot. In the same
audit report, the State Auditor also found that the Crowley Facility showed an inmate to
staff ratio of 4.2, the highest among four other private prisons in the state of Colorado. In
terms of security staffing, the records reflect that there were eight (8) correctional officers

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present during the riot who were new hires and were undergoing on-the-job training and
thirty-three (33) officers working in security and housing unit posts. I also noted a
glaring example of a correctional officer who was assigned to work in the segregation
unit during the evening of the riot.

This correctional officer had no former law

enforcement or corrections related background prior to his employment on July 27, 2003
at CCCF as a correctional officer. This officer was apparently working in the high
security segregation unit with an experience level of only two (2) to three (3) months
when he was initially assigned and with about eight (8) months total experience on the
day of the riot. Typically, in a well functioning correctional facility, correctional officers
assigned to high security areas of the facility have substantial experience in corrections
and in facility operations. CCA management could have insured that there were ample
and experienced security staff at the facility during the ramp up process of increasing it’s
inmate population.
CCA was not adequately prepared in terms of emergency preparedness.
Emergency drills were rarely conducted; therefore, how could they reasonably expect for
line staff and middle managers to react in an emergency situation? Security and civilian
staff need to be continuously drilled on emergency preparedness procedures. Security
staff and civilian staff as well as inmates must have a reasonable expectation of what to
do in an emergency situation. Emergency drills also help a facility identify weak areas in
the security program of the facility and to be better prepared. For example, I noted
several security breakdowns attributed in large part to a lack of emergency preparedness
by CCA management, such as not having enough flex cuffs to handle the large inmate
population, indecisiveness by security supervisors in handling the disturbance at the

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onset, not having an adequate internal response team on hand in terms of numbers and
training, among many others as reported in the After Action Report. CCA could have
insisted that they not accept any more inmates until such time as they were reasonably
prepared in terms of emergency preparedness. The area of emergency preparedness is
paramount to any successful security response and CCA was severely dysfunctional in
this area of operation. The Warden and other facility security supervisors could have
ensured that their emergency plans were in place, workable, and that sufficient resources
were available to effect the emergency plans.
Other reasonable steps CCA could have taken to prevent the riot was to have dealt
with and provided corrective action plans to the litany of operational and administrative
concerns the Colorado Department of Corrections had expressed during the months
leading up to the riot, as noted on pages fifteen (15) and sixteen (16) of the After Action
Report.
2. Reasonable steps CCA could have taken to prevent the disturbance from
becoming a riot.
Certainly, CCA could have been better prepared to prevent the disturbance from
becoming a riot if they would have had additional staff on duty on the evening of the riot,
especially in light of the warning signs. Also, there was a slow response by CCA to
realize that the grouping of inmates was a sign of problems to come, but failed to take
prompt action.
The lack of fencing and controlled movement of inmates contributed to allowing
the inmates to take control of the facility rather quickly. If CCA had a controlled inmate
movement plan in place and proper fencing to separate large numbers of inmates, they
could have better contained the disturbance and prevented it from becoming a riot.
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The lack of the security supervisors and the administration to address the inmates
concerns and grievances in a prompt manner was a major factor in the disturbance
escalating to a riot. There was already a high level of tension among the inmates prior to
the disturbance which should have been addressed by CCA officials.
Given the warning signs of an impending disturbance or security problems, CCA
should have taken measures to limit the numbers of inmates who could be out of their
housing units at any given time. This would have limited the number of inmates who
were outside their living areas when the disturbance started.
The slow response by all available CCA security staff and their internal response
team lead to giving the riotous inmates the upper hand and enabled them to take control
of the facility. This was largely due to the apparent indecisiveness by the on-site security
supervisors.
The decision of the on-site Captain for officers to abandon the housing unit
control centers allowed rioting inmates quick access to housing units and to inmates they
targeted for assaults. The control centers of housing units are generally more difficult to
penetrate than other areas of the facility. Also, CCA could have had limited numbers of
chemical agents to disperse through port holes into the various housing unit pods and
underneath the housing unit control centers. Astonishingly, the segregation unit control
center was abandoned and there were still two (2) correctional officers in the unit who
had to hide in a cell to avoid the riotous inmates. CCA should have known that the
housing unit emergency hatches could not be secured once they were open, which
allowed rioting inmates access to the roofs, causing further damage and allowed the
riotous inmates better observation of staff and inmate locations during the riot. This

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deficiency could probably have been detected had CCA conducted frequent emergency
drills.
CCA could have also ensured that inmate records containing information about
inmates was placed in an inaccessible location to inmates in the facility. Rioting inmates
targeted the files of inmates to help them identify other inmates they wanted to cause
harm to, such as sex offenders and informants or perceived informants.
3. CCA could have taken a number of reasonable steps to prevent the assault and
injuries sustained by Rudy Lujan during the riot.
During the riot on July 20, 2004, the decision was made by the on-site supervisor
for security staff to abandon their posts and retreat to the administrative area of the
facility. This left all of the inmates completely unsupervised and left them to their own
devices. Unfortunately, the ground work had already been laid out for some time prior to
the riot with the breakdown of the security, staffing and administrative systems that are
designed to help prevent and deal effectively with disturbances and other types of
emergencies.
As a result of breakdowns in security, staffing and administration, it contributed
to allowing inmates to take the facility over and seriously injure Rudy Lujan and others
and caused substantial property damage to the facility.
The problems associated with the July 20, 2004 riot are not limited to actions or
inactions taken on that fateful evening, but rather a cumulative and predictable series of
facility breakdowns in security, staffing and administration. Some of the reasonable steps
CCA could have taken to prevent the assault and injuries sustained by Rudy Lujan and
others are: slow down the pace of ramping up the facility with out-of-state inmates especially in light of having many new correctional officers and inadequate staffing
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levels; take action regarding inmate and staff concerns about warnings of an impending
disturbance; proactively investigate inmate grievances regarding disparity of treatment
among out-of-state and Colorado inmates; address food service complaints of which
Colorado Department of Corrections officials found to be of “very poor quality and
distasteful”; the use of force incident involving inmate Graham earlier in the day on July
20, 2004, “could have been handled differently had adequate staff had been on hand to
deal with Graham when it first started”; a more prompt response by security staff to
secure the facility when the disturbance first started; better leadership was needed at the
onset of the disturbance; the apparent decision by the CCA Sort Team Commander to
“stand down” and waiting for the Colorado Department of Corrections to respond
allowed the rioting inmates more time to create havoc and mayhem and CCA could have
ensured that they had adequately trained, experienced and ample numbers of SORT team
members available to handle a major emergency.
4. Defendants acted deliberately indifferent to Rudy Lujan’s safety, welfare and
need for protection.
Rudy Lujan was a known gang member to CCA staff although he had, at some
point, separated from the GKI gang. Rudy Lujan’s gang affiliation and subsequent
departure from it was known to CCA staff. Rudy Lujan was moved several times to
different housing areas as a result of having problems with other inmates. CCA staff
knew that Rudy Lujan had sustained injury at least on one occasion and informed the
CCA Facility Investigator in 2004, of having problems with other inmates and being
assaulted in his cell. Astonishingly, it seems to be the practice of CCA staff not to allow
an inmate a transfer out of the facility unless the inmate, who is potentially being
victimized, names his assailants. Also, an inmate apparently has to tell a staff member
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that he is in fear of being killed before being placed in segregation and an investigation
initiated. Based upon the fact that Rudy Lujan was experiencing problems at CCCF with
other inmates, had sustained injury on at least one other occasion and reportedly been
assaulted several other times, this should have been the basis for conducting a thorough
investigation to see what was happening.

Rudy Lujan could have been moved,

involuntarily, into a segregated status for his own protection and the Colorado DOC
informed about it in order to ensure his safety. It is obvious, by what transpired on the
evening of July 20, 2004 that Rudy Lujan was specifically sought out and brutalized by
other inmates.

5.

Deliberate indifferent to the health, safety and protection of the inmates,

including Rudy Lujan.

Lastly, it is my opinion, based on the foregoing, that the Defendants conduct in
the failure to prevent the riot constitutes deliberate indifference to the health, safety and
protection of the inmates, including Rudy Lujan. This opinion is based on the totality of
evidence I have received in this case and on my experience as a corrections expert.
This report may be supplemented as additional information is received and
reviewed.

Respectfully submitted, this
2nd day of November 2006

Manuel D. Romero
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Manuel D. Romero
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Report of Plaintiffs’ Expert Witness
Manuel D. Romero
November 2, 2006

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