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Arizona Doc Memo Re Az Private Prison Assessments 2010
ARIZONA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS OFFENDER OPERATIONS MEMORANDUM TO: Robert Patton, Division Director of Operations FROM: Shelly Sonberg, Southern Region Operations Director SUBJECT: Security Assessment - MTC: Marana and GEO: Phoenix West, Florence West and CACF DATE: August 22,2010 During the week of August 16, 2010 two ADC Audit and Assessment teams were assembled for the purpose of conducting a review at the below listed contact beds. On August 16, 2010, the Security Assessment team arrived at the ASP-Marana. At 1600 hours, the team met with Warden Terry Royal and Steve Foley, the Deputy Warden. They were taken on a tour of the facility and then began the assessment. The assessment was conducted during the course of all three shifts and concluded on August 17, 2010. On August 17, 2010 at 1600 hours, the Security Assessment team arrived at ASPPhoenix West. The team met with Warden Mel Thomas, Assistant Warden of Operations Richard Sheppard. They were taken on a tour of the facility and then began they assessment. The assessment was conducted during the course of all three shifts and concluded on August 18, 2010. Team members: DWOP James O'Neil, ASPC - Perryville Major Mario Diaz, ASPC - Lewis Major Richard Haggard, ASPC-Safford Captain Ron Lawrence, ASPC - Lewis Captain Bryan Dennis, ASPC - Tucson Captain Glen Pacheco, ASPC-Tucson Lieutenant Larry Ridge, ASPC-Phoenix On August 16,2010, the Security Assessment team arrived at the Florence West. At 1500 hours, the team met with Warden Rick Mauldin, the Deputy Warden and Chief of Security. They were taken on a tour of the facility and then began the assessment. The assessment was conducted during the course of all three shifts and concluded on August 17,2010. On August 18, 2010, the Security Assessment team arrived at CACF. At 0900 hours, the team met with Warden John Gay, Deputy Warden Rollins, and the Chief of Security. 1 They were taken on a tour of the facility and then began our assessment. The assessment was conducted during the course of all three shifts and concludedon August 19, 2010. Team Members: DWOP Tara R. Diaz , ASPC-Florence Major Ed Lao, ASPC-Florence Major Sam Higginson, ASPC-Eyman Captain Fredrick Burch, ASPC-Eyman Lt. Mark Huggins, ASPC -Eyman Lt. Dorothy Nelson, ASPC-Florence The results and evaluations are provided for your review. Security Assessment - GEO - Florence West and CACF Team members: DWOP Tara R. Diaz , ASPC-Florence Major Ed Lao, ASPC-Florence Major Sam Higginson, ASPC-Eyman Captain Fredrick Burch, ASPC-Eyman Lt. Mark Huggins, ASPC -Eyman Lt. Dorothy Nelson, ASPC-Florence On August 16, 2010, the Security Assessment team arrived at the Florence West. At 1500 hours, the team met with Warden Rick Mauldin, the Deputy Warden and Chief of Security. We were taken on a tour of the facility and then began our assessment. The assessment was conducted during the course of all three shifts and concluded on August 17,2010. On August 18,2010, the Security Assessment team arrived at CACF. At 0900 hours, the team met with Warden John Gay, Deputy Warden Rollins, and the Chief of Security. We were taken on a tour of the facility and then began our assessment. The assessment was conducted during the course of all three shifts and concluded on August 19, 2010. Following is a summary ofthe team's findings: Initial Tour: Florence West and CACF - The team observed inmates on the recreation field, in housing units, and working in the laundry and kitchen. The yard layout allows for a clear visual across the entire yard. Officers were observed in the pods doing security checks and interacting with inmates. At CACF we also had the opportunity to observe inmates in GED/TABE and Sex Offender Treatment Programming. The team was impressed by the level of sanitation on both units. Florence West has a total capacity of750 inmates when filled. CACF has a total capacity of 1280 inmates per the contract. 2 Assessment Team's Observation Summary: Florence West• The unit had a security device tracking system in place. However it lacked administrative review and follow-up. During this assessment, Major Lao reviewed the past 90 days of work orders logged in as deficiencies. In addition, he also reviewed Information Reports going back 90 days. It was noted (11) eleven security device deficiencies reported were not present in the log. Security Device Packets and Information Reports have been signed by the management team; however, tracking and review of such should be done on a weekly basis and monthly to identify and address open items. • The team observed inmates in detention status recreating freely in the detention pod with the door open to the exterior recreation enclosure allowing the inmate to go back and forth. The inmate's cell door remained open during this period as well. Although this area is monitored by cameras, these inmates should be supervised commensurate to their current custody status regardless of current classification level. A misting system was not in place. The team recommends a misting system be installed in the recreation enclosures and standard detention procedures be adhered to. Warden Mauldin states he does not have the staff to supervise detention inmates in recreation enclosures and. this is why the current practice is in place. • The sweat lodge is located in no-man's land between the Building 2 and Dorm 3. The lodge is not fenced or secured in any marmer. The team recommends the sweat lodge be fenced and razor ribbon applied, or relocated. • The Warden, Deputy Warden, Chief of Security and Shift Supervisors were all observed on the yard touring talking to staff and inmates both days during our assessment. It was obvious inmates know who these staff are as they addressed each by their name or rank. • Per staff, one inmate is allowed in the housing unit officer work station at a time. Although the Housing Unit Post Order, Section 1.17 states: The Housing Unit Security Officer shall not allow inmates to enter the Housing Unit Work Station without authorization. The work station has a control panel that can open the emergency doors leading from the building to no-man's land. The officer's do not disable the control panel before allowing an inmate access. Mail and form distribution. Is conducted in the work station. UA's are conducted in the work station area/restroom. Warden Mauldin will have the emergency exits disabled on the housing unit panel so that the doors can only be opened by Main Control. The team recommends that a post order revision is done stating one inmate is authorized in the workstation at a time, rather than the unit operating under a blanket understanding or verbal directive. Warden Mauldin agreed that this should be completed. It is further recommended U/As be conducted elsewhere. • DO 704 is not enforced regarding inmate dress in the housing unit. Inmates were observed in their boxers with no t-shirts on while in the housing unit during the daytime hours. 3 Alarm Zone System: Florence West - This is a minimum security facility housing our and Retum to Custody (RTC) inmates. This facility does not have an alarm zone system and is comprised of a single fence with an inner and outer sand trap. There is no requirement for minimum custody facilities. Perimeter: Florence West • Although there is no dedicated vehicle perimeter for this uuit, inner and outer perimeter walks are conducted at least every hour on graveyard. This was confirmed by actual observations and a review of the journals. Joumals reflect a consistent practice. • There were several notable issues on the front sand trap.' While the area is clean the mediajs tightly packed dirt which makes capturing prints difficult. This was tested on August 16,2010 with the presence of a shift supervisor. The tractor did turn the dirt on August I i'n· • The uuit lacks a sand trap in the rear due to a natural embankment where the perimeter road is constructed. This is a physical plant issue. • The west side perimeter is in good condition. The media appears to be soft and easily captures prints. • The East side perimeter sand trap is in fair condition. • Overall the sand trap lacks the consistent degree of attention because of the difference in the media consistency. • The unit also maintains an inner sand trap which is separated in light grade fencing posts and wire. Some areas have the demarcation wire loose or just laying on the ground. This should be addressed as a security device deficiency. • The sand condition. • • • • • • The perimeter road is adequate, but lacks the turn around required every 400 feet. The perimeter fence meets the minimum custody fence requirement. The Fence has a second row of razor ribbon that is suspended on the required first row concertina razor wire. This is in excess of what the standard fencing requirement. Lighting is adequate on the perimeter, and facility with the exception of what was noted on the west side perimeter. During the assessment period Major Lao observed and heard the officers conducting the inner-perimeter checks reporting observing "foot prints" to the control center. These prints were being assessed as "staff tracks" and staff raked them out. While an officer's assessment of tracks may be sufficient, it should be elevated to a supervisor for final approval to ensure that check and balances are kept. The inner perimeter no-mans land is full of foot prints. This area should be cleared of such to provide an expanded area of detection in the event of an 4 intrusion or escape. It should never be a "norm" to have foot prints left in areas where inmates have restricted access. Counts: Florence West - All formal counts and two informal graveyard counts were observed. The facility was found to be in compliance with policy. Formal count times are consistent with ADC established times. • The operational count process was excellent. There were two officers that independently counted the inmates in each pod. This system narrows the margin of error during count and is an excellent check and balance system • Consistent face to ID counts is conducted during formal count. It was obvious to the team that this is standard procedure as the inmates did not comment or resist when staff requested to see faces. • Dorm 5 - RTC inmate's dorm begins count Y, hour before the rest of the unit. When the building has cleared count the inmates are released to the chow hall for meals. The inmates are not escorted even though the entire unit count has not cleared. • Formal counts for Graveyard are done at 2300 and 0400; informal counts are conducted every hour between those times in the same fashion as formal with two staff. Armory: Florence West - An assessment of the armory procedures revealed the following • • • • Per DO 716.02.1.1.3, the assigned Control Room Officer shall inventory weapons at the beginning and ending of each shift and enter the inventory into the post correctional journal. Only the graveyard shift· breaks the security tags and actually physically inventories the weapons. Per the Unit Post Order, PO-044.03.l.5, At the beginning/end of hislher assigned shift, the Main Control Room Security Officer shall inventory and account for the following assigned equipment - 1.5.3 Weapons, chemical agents and anununition assigned to the weapons storage locker using ADC Form #716-3P, Daily Armory Inventory. The form is being completed by the shifts, however, only graveyard shift is actually inventories the weapons and anununition. The other shifts use the security tags as a means of accounting for the equipment and use the master inventory to fill in the numbers. Each of the weapons lockers have unit made signature sheets which are not being utilized consistently. Sonie of the sheets reflect that the lockers have not been accessed for an extended period of time. The last dates go back as far as 10-1-09. The inventories attached to the lockers were out-dated, with most of them dating back to January or April of 2008. Changes to the inventories were made by lining out the numbers and writing in new entires. 5 Inmate Movement: Florence West - Minimum custody does not require a controlled movement plan. • The pod doors are locked after the yard closes at 2000 hours so that inmates cannot exit until the yard opens in the morning. Ingress/Egress: Florence West• During normal business hours a non-uniform staff is posted at the ingress point and conducts these duties. On the first day of our assessment ingress was not up to par. Staff processing ingress legress lacked command presence and control of the area. Boots were not checked if removed to clear the scanner, not all cell phones were checked to ensure they were state issue. The process was not organized at all. All subsequent visits were conducted in an orderly fashion and all items checked carefully by the non-uniform ingress staff. • Graveyard and Dayshift staff was processed by a Shift Supervisor. The Security Supervisors thoroughly went through staff s property being brought in. The supervisors asked ADC staff all the important questions, i.e. cell phone, pager, about money; however, failed to ask their own staff. • NOTE: On 08/16/2010 Graveyard staff was allowed to punch in at the time clock prior to clearing scanner. The time clock sets on the wall beyond the scanner. Searches: Florence West - Lt. Huggins observed several stiiffconducting searches of housing areas and followed up by checking all pertinent paper work pertaining to searches to include search logs and journals. He also observed Yard movement and spoke to numerous staff (both line and supervisory) to ascertain if any random pat searches were being conducted of inmates on the yard and if there are operating procedures pertaining to. Below are the findings: • Housing Area Searches: Staff conducting the housing area searches did so in a manner unlikely to produce positive results. They were not conducted in a systematic or consistent fashion. Inmates were not searched prior to there living area being searched. Televisions were not examined and most of the clothing items were merely squeezed and placed aside. The bunks themselves were not checked for any tampering or examined at all. • Pat Searches: During the time spent at the unit there were no observed pat searches being conducted 1:iy any staff on the Yard or in the buildings. Staff were asked if they conducted pat searches and they replied that they did do them but not on a regular basis. Medical Security stated they pat search the porter when he departs, however inmates in for appointments are not pat searched in or out of the health unit. • Strip Searches: Strip searches of Off-Site Inmate Workers were observed and they were completed in a thorough and consistent manner in compliance with DOC policy. • Search Logs: All housing area searches were logged in search logs and logged in the Housing Unit journals as per policy. Lt. Huggins found no entries of common area searches in the search logs and/or the journals. 6 Keys: Both Units utilize the Key Watcher System. Florence West - In compliaoce Tools: Florence West• The Maintenaoce aod Unit Tool Room is in compliaoce. Beginning aod ending inventories were logged in the service journal as required. Master inventories accurate. Tool issue logs completed as required. NOTE: Captain Burch did observe ao inmate in the Class B tool cage haoding tools out to inmates as the Officer logged them on the tool issue form. • Kitchen Tool Accountability - Tool storage, master inventory aod tool issue forms in compliaoce. Tools are cabled aod locked when in use for meals. Inventories are not consistently logged in the service journal. No post order for this area. NOTE: Per Warden Mauldin, there is not a post order because this is not a required post per the contract • Medical - in compliaoce. Sharps aod tool inventories are being completed. However, there is not a post order for this area either for the same reason noted in the kitchen. Journals: Florence West• Service Journals have the required beginning entries pre-printed. Staff has to only write in the time aod who conducted the specific task, i.e., Security Device Inspection, Beginning Equipment Inventories. • Security, health aod welfare checks are logged as per post order requirements. • A review of the journals showed Sergeaots and above touring aod on post regularly during all shifts. Phone Monitoring: In both facilities, phone calls monitored each week are recorded on the Eymao Intel Report. Florence West - Phone monitoring is completed by the Accountability Officer who also performs duties of SSU. Visitation: Florence West• Staff interviewed informed Lt. Nelson that if ao inmate's visitor is suspended from visitation that the phone for that visitor is also suspended. When advised of the suspension, notification is made to the Securus Representative, Susao Gastelum via e-mail, who in-turn disables the phone number either the same day or with in one work day. • Inmates are not allowed to add denied visitors to their phone list. • Visitation is Saturday aod Sunday. Emergency Response Plan: Florence West - The Emergency Response Plao meets the intent aod principles of providing business continuity. 7 • • In reviewing the plan it provides the bare minimum requirements and contacts that need to be triggered / notified in the event of the disruption of services, or inmate unrest. While the response plan is not detailed, it does provide some guidance to the incident commander. The emergency response plan will not satisfY the requirements of ADC' s Emergency response plan data collection instrument. Assessment Team's Observation Summary: CACF• The chief of security tracks the security device deficiencies for the unit. His log is detailed and includes regular work orders as well. ADC requirement for security device tracking system requires a separate review by the Chief of Security and a separate the log to meet the requirement. • Unit sanitation is excellent and it was the first observation made by the team members. • DO 704 was very good overall. Inmate pants are tucked in and their IO's are on while on the yard. We observed adherence to facial hair grooming requirements was not enforced. Inmates were observed with mustaches out of compliance and having goatees. Inmates were found to be in dress compliance in the housing units. • The sweat lodge is located inside the yard perimeter. • Inmates and staff know the Warden, Captain and Assistant Warden. • While conducting an audit of the units Medical Sharps accountability it was noted that the Medical sharps accountability was being conducted in accordance with DOC standards; however, Lt. Huggins noted that the sharps accountability was not being logged in the Health Unit service journal in accordance with post orders. L> VVlUI< Shift Lt Huggins • While speaking with staff posted asked if their weapons were Both staff Follow advised that it is not the unit procedure suggested up with Warden Gay revealed during last years to the Warden that Main Control should not have to only due to a staff suicide run the perimeter and transportation or shooting that had occurred in another IiiSmultion. Alarm Zone System: CACF• CACF utilizes a hybrid microwave and ported coaxial buried cable. The alarm system is tested twice per 8 hour shift. Zone testing and activation is conducted by walking through the zones and disrupting the electromagnetic field or microwave beam. Monitoring of the system alarms occur at the unit main control. The system provides both the audible alarm and a visual display of a triggered zone on a digital graphic site map. • System testing was observed during our assessment. T4e control officers were knowledgeable on the operation of the system. The main control officer was rearming the zones as the officer conducting the test departs. This is critical and notable to mention because it does not allow gaps in zone coverage during the 8 • • • process. The main control officer even explained the same rationale why she was rearming the zones immediately. The monitors are positioned in an area where it is visible to the officers at all times while they are doing their duties. Workload in the main control was evenly distributed between the two officers. Even with high traffic from shift change staff were able to monitor the zones. The workstation combined both zone monitoring and site control also displayed on the same monitor that required control officers to focus on the display and observe the zone alarms. According to the officers, "False Alarms" were not common. During our tour however, we observed there are a few internally monitored doors (warehouse) areas which the officers could not reset to display secure. According to the officers and the Chief of Security, parts were already ordered and are awaiting their arrival. In instances where an area is displaying unsecure, the main control officer notified a yard officer to clear the area via a security check. Even on our graveyard tour the control officers were conducting building checks in this area. The unit was not aware we were monitoring their radio traffic. This indicates that the practice is consistent. There was no hard copy report generated about zone activity for the shift. This information was archived via computer but could be retrieved for review. Perimeter: CACF• The CACF Perimeter is in excellent condition. Sand traps are well maintained and easily capture intrusions. The fence is compliant with the ADC Physical Plant standards for medium custody. • Perimeter Patrols were very alert and provide continuous patrols. During the past few days their patrol was detected and challenged by ADC staff entering without permission. ~ • The front perimeter area is patrolled on foot by the lobby officer. When asked why she was doing it she stated because perimeter patrol cannot effectively monitor any intrusions on the front part of the building because of the many obstructions to the visibility of the area (parked vehicles in the parking lot). • There was an enormous amount of materials outside behind the ACI Building to include pallets and wood scraps. On August 18, 20 I 0, we were successfully able to breach the unit sand trap and we placed an inert simulated tool by the fence to see if our intrusion would be detected. Neither the intrusion nor the tool was detected from swing shift at 2030 hours, through approximately 2200 hours, after the zone check was completed. The perimeter failed to detect the intrusion because the perimeter assessment team utilized scrap wood and placed it on the sand trap to avoid leaving traditional foot prints while placing the inert test object on the perimeter. The wood plank was retrieved after this was set which left virtually no trace evidence of intrusion. CACF is addressing this issue in concert with ACI. 9 Counts: CACF ~ Formal and informal counts were observed. Count times are consistent with ADC established times. The facility is in compliance with policy. • CACF practices the same procedures as Florence West for counts (two officer count). • We did not observe any inmate movement during count. Armory: CACFy! e'ap()ns shall be stored armory, DART one discrepancy observed was the locker weapons. The weapons used for inmate • Per DO 716.02.1.1.3, the assigned Control Room Officer shall inventory weapons at the beginning and ending of each shift and enter the inventory into the post correctional journal. The officers assigned to Main Control conduct a beginning and ending inventory of weapons which they record on an in house inventory sheet. The inventories are not being recorded in the service journal as required. Inmate Movement: CACF - Medium custody sex offender unit. The Unit practices controlled movement for turn outs. • • • • Direction of travel on the yard to the chow hall and programs section of the yard is one way. Inmates were observed following this directive without being prompted. Housing Unit ingress/egress doors and emergency exits are controlled by the Unit Main Control. The Housing Unit Officer advises Main Control of when to open the door for a major turn out such as medical appointments once all inmates are staged in the pod sally port area. EIP Phase Recreation is practiced. As a result on non-working days the Unit could have half of the population out to recreation if all of the inmates participate. Total population capacity is 1280. During the weekdays we observed mass amounts of inmates on the yard either recreating, working, at education or programming. The yard goes on a hard lock down at 2000 hours every day. No inmate movement occurs except for emergencies. IngresslEgress: CACF• Ingress / Egress is conducted by security personnel. • Food is not carried through metal detector, however was visually searched to ensure it is in clear containers. 10 • • During the busy shift change times, staff crowded the scanner and the officer lost control over who had cleared and who had not cleared. Staff is not consistently made to take boots off in an attempt to clear the scanner if they could not clear with them on. Those staff that did take their boots off did not consistently have the boots searched by the ingress officer. Keys: Both Units utilize the Key Watcher System. CACF - In compliance Tools: CACF• Per the Unit Post Order, PO-018.1.S.1 The Tool Control Officer shall conduct a beginning and ending tool inventory and shall log the results in the Correctional Service JOurnal. A review of th~ service joumal revealed that the tool room officer was documenting a beginmng inventory, however, was not documenting an ending inventory. The officer stated that he was conducting an ending inventory every day. This ending inventory was not being recorded in the service journal. • Per DO 712.02.1.2.1.3 The Tool Control Officer shaH conduct a daily tool inventory, documenting the results of the inventory in the Tool Room Correctional Service Journal. The ACI Fumiture Shop does not keep a service journal. The tools assigned there are inventoried daily, but there is not a service journal present for use of documenting the inventories. Journals: CACF• Reviews of Service Journals at this facility were consistent with the findings at Florence West. • The only discrepancies found were in the Tool Rooms and Medical where the tool and sharps inventories were not being logged appropriately, although the inventories were being completed and documented on medical logs for tracking purposes. Phone Monitoring: In both facilities, phone calls monitored each week are recorded on the Eyman Intel Report. CACF - Phone monitoring is completed by the Warden, Assistant Warden and Sgt. who handles SSU duties. Visitation: CACF• In compliance. If a visitor is suspended the phone number is removed from the phone system. It was also noted that if a visitor application is denied the inmate is not allowed to place them on a phone list. • Visitation is held Saturday, Sunday and Monday due to the large population. 11 Emergency Response Plan: CACF - The emergency response plan was generic; however, it meets the intent to address business continuity in the event of disruption. This response plan will not meet the required ADC Data Collection Instrument for ERP. Security Assessment - MTC: Marana and GEO: Phoenix West Team members: DWOP James O'Neil, ASPC - Perryville Major Mario Diaz, ASPC - Lewis Major Richard Haggard, ASPC-Safford Captain Ron Lawrence, ASPC - Lewis Captain Bryan Dennis, ASPC - Tucson Captain Glen Pacheco, ASPC-Tucson Lieutenant Larry Ridge, ASPC-Phoenix On August 16, 2010, the Security Assessment team arrived at the ASP-Marana. At 1600 hours, the team met with Warden Terry Royal and Steve Foley, the Deputy Warden. We were taken on a tour of the facility and then began our assessment. The assessment was conducted during the course of all three shifts and concluded on August 17, 2010. On August 17, 2010 at 1600 hours, the Security Assessment team arrived at ASPPhoenix West. The team met with Warden Mel Thomas, Assistant Warden of Operations Richard Sheppard. We were taken on a tour of the facility and then began our assessment. The assessment was conducted during the course of all three shifts and concluded on August 18, 2010. Following is a summary of the team's findings for ASP-Marana: Initial Tour: ASP-Marana The unit consists of two Housing Units (Unit I and Unit 2) with a Control Room for each Housing Unit. There is not a designated Main Control. Each Housing Unit is divided into pods, Unit I (4 pods), Unit 2 (6 pods). Doors along the outer wall in these pods provide access to the outside recreation areas. These recreation areas are separated by fencing to reduce inmate traffic. The fencing for the recreation area is the unit's Perimeter Fence. Assessment Team's Observation Summary: The Warden and Deputy Warden were all observed on the yard touring talking to staff and inmates both days during our assessment. SROD Sonberg pointed out the Unit Deputy Warden to several inmates. It is noted they said they did not recognize him. Command presence was observed by the team, inmates were respectful and compliant. The ADC monitor was on state furlough the 16th and was not present during the assessment. • The 1600 hour formal count was in the process. Inmates were observed in their assigned housing areas/pods. Officers were observed in the pods doing security checks and interacting with inmates. It is noted, inmates were observed playing 12 cards and moving about the pod prior to the formal count being cleared and announced. • All inmate living areas and line were extremely warm and humid. The temperature felt to be above what seemed like a normal threshold for this time of year. Many of the swamp cooler vents were not blowing air. Inmates were very vocal about the heat. All audit team members were keenly aware the temperature was extremely uncomfortable beyond expected levels. In discussions with inmates this was the predominate issue raised. Warden Royal stated the coolers were on. with the exception of 4 coolers. He stated they were inoperable and were being worked on. Unit 2 Control cooler was down during the assessment and registered 84 degrees at 0600 hours. It is noted it was cooler outside than in the buildings. The blowers were not blowing the cool air into the buildings. Advised Warden Royal and DW Foley of the concerns and was advised maintenance was working on the coolers at that time. • DO 704 is not enforced regarding inmate dress in the housing unit. Inmates were observed moving about in only their boxer shorts and they were not wearing tee shirts. • The unit sanitation was poor to include the living areas. We did not observe inmates working or cleaning.. Inmate clothing was observed throughout the unit in common areas and on the recreation field. Paint is needed throughout the unit. • Door runner rugs were present at each door leading to the recreation area from all pods. Several were used by inmates to prop the door open., Warden Royal was advised of security concerns with these being used to defeat razor wire. • Tour of the Kitchen noted serving utensils were cabled; however, they were not secured with padlocks. Cables were fed through the slots for locking and gave the impression they were secure. Kitchen sanitation was substandard. A state inspection would not have gone well. Several articles of civilian clothing was observed hanging in the kitchen prep area office. • Control room windows were observed without any bars or barriers beyond plexiglass. Inmates could gain easy access during an incident. Each control room maintains keys. This could cause a significant issue should the control room window be broken out. There is no system in place to disable the control panel and abandon the post in an emergency. • The Sweat Lodge is currently closed pending movement to a more secure area. It currently is adjacent to the perimeter fence. • Detention Recreation Enclosures have water coolers and misters in place. Shade is inadequate as it only covered half of the enclosures. • Weapons material was observed throughout unit. A large piece of piexi-glass over the serving line 3"XIO"X3/8 had a comer piece broken off and it was unaccounted for. The large piece was removed at our request. A metal cover for the exhaust switch in the kitchen not secured. Mops, brooms and squeegees were left throughout unit, in living areas and bathrooms. An 8 foot hose was observed in I-pod porter closet It was removed immediately by unit staff. • The camera system does not have any recording capability. Housing Unit I and 2 both have monitors down. 13 • • Staff uniforms are kept in a connex within the Unit. Uniforms are provided to oncall staff or staff working overtime. Uniforms are provided to new staff. Inventory was inaccurate upon review. The inventory was not accurate. Doors were not secured in a consistent manner within the buildings and between the buildings. One line staff member indicated they were usually locked when "DOC" was there. Alarm Zone System: Marana - This is a minimum security facility housing inmates with substance abuse treatment needs. This facility does not have an alarm zone system and is comprised of a single fence with an inner "no mans track" and outer sand trap. Perimeter lighting is not motion sensor and is static. Control Room Door Indicator Panel does not function as designed. Housing Unit 1 and 2 indicates multiple doors unsecured. Several of these doors are exterior doors from the inmate housing pods to the recreation area. Control room staff are not alerted as the doors always are indicated as being accessed. This increases the risk of imnates gaining access the perimeter fence undetected. Staffs do not check the doors as it has become common place knowledge the panels are not working. This is compounded with the absence of a perimeter alarm system, the camera system deficiencies and poor perimeter lighting. A review of the Security Device Work Order Tracking Document for the panel is dared 5/14110. Multiple staff interviewed to include the Chief of Security acknowledged these indicator lights have been down for several months. Management staff stated the panels had not been replaced due to fiscal reasons. Perimeter: Marana• Following the Kingman escape, a perimeter vehicle was established to operate between the hours of 1600 and 2100 hours until ofthe 2030 hour count clears. Interior walks are conducted three times per shift. Observations by the team and journal reviews indicate this practice is consistent. The outer sand trap is inadequate due to being hard packed dirt that virtually eliminates the ability to observe tracks. This was tested on 8/17 where both the vehicle perimeter and an officer walking the outer perimeter missed the tracks set by audit staff. It is noted the Warden and deputy Warden were very defensive of this security challenge. They thought only one foot print was left making it impossible for the officer to see. Numerous prints were left. The ground is hard and needs attention. • . Perimeter lighting is inadequate and contributes to the inability to observe tracks within the perimeter drag. The lighting hinders visibility on the working cameas. • The east side of the perimeter was lined with large plants and mesquite trees overhanging into the perimeter. The landscaping prevents visibility of the fence line. The west side did not have any obstacles near the perimeter. • The unit also maintains an inner "no mans land" that is a small track within the recreation yards. This area was not cleared of tracks. • Staff were observed walking the outer perimeter drag while pulling a double rake behind them. It is recommended they utilize the interior track for the purpose of conducting fence integrity checks and track observations. 14 • • • • • • • • • The perimeter road is adequate. Signs and a barrier fence (U'e present to control traffic onto the perimeter. The perimeter fence meets the minimum custody fence requirements, with the exception of the gates. The perimeter fence has a gate installed at each recreation yard. These gates are latched type and secured with a chain and padlock. It is possible to be defeated by breaking the latch which would loosen the chain and allow an inmate to fit through the gap. Perimeter fencing was observed with objects left hanging in it (Frisbees). The sally port has several areas that can be breached with little effort and minimal contact with razor wire. The sally port gate has razor wire installed on the outside of the gate not the inside. Based on the gate design there are railings on the fence that can be used as ladders. The roof of the administration building towards the sally port has hand railing above a wall ladder with a tunnel trap installed. This is adjacent to a door awning which could be used to climb to the roof. The handle can be used to reach the hand rail as a pull up bar. No razor wire is present on the roof in this area Fencing and no climb in the following areas is loose and in need of repair. The inner walk thru sally port leading to Unit 1, the South West comer fence in the sally port. Recommend reinforcing roofs of all buildings with razorwire. Fence ties are "fish hook" type not "twist" type. They are painted red. There is no accountability process in place. The Ansi! system in the Kitchen was not charged. Administration provided bid proposal for repair dated 8111/10. Counts: Marana - Formal counts were observed on all shifts. The facility was found to be in compliance with policy. Formal count times are consistent with ADC established times. • The operational count process was excellent. Supervisors conducted the count and were. observed reconciling the out counts with the Green Bar count sheets. • Consistent faces to ID counts are conducted during formal count. • Emergency Count was conducted and cleared within 18 minutes. • Informal counts are conducted within each hour during graveyard shift. It is noted the Warden was did not know how often informal counts occur on graveyard shift. Armory: Marana - An assessment of the armory procedures revealed the following: All weapons are issued from the Armory. • Post Order 700 sec 20.19 requires during weapons e~change at a hospital, in the absence of a clearing barrel, "1!1ifu~!J&jQTh~§. • Per Weapons shall be 'LUJL"U' Marana has all of their weiipOlas • 716.02 .. 1.3, the inventory weapons at the beginning and ending of each shift and enter the inventory into the post correctional j ourna!. Shift Lieutenant conducts a seal inventory at the 15 beginning and ending of each shift. Actual weapon inventory is not conducted per policy. Inmate Movement: Marana - Minimum custody does not require a controlled movement plan. • The pod doors are secured after the yard closes at 2000 hours so that inmates cannot exit until the yard opens in the morning. Ingress/Egress: Marana• Uniformed officer conducted ingress and egress check. Inconsistent application was noticed as some staff had their personal items searched while others were allowed in without checking. All staff were observed to be required to clear the metal detector. SROD's shoes activated however staff did not search the shoes and allowed entrance. Audit team exiting Unit was allowed to exit without showingID. • The metal detector is set on silent. The alert light bar is only visible only to the officer checking the staff entering the unit. This lends to aperception, perhaps enforcement is not taken seriously. • Work crew egress was observed to be in compliance. Excellent orgauization from the sally port officer. All inmates appropriately identified and accounted for. • Pat searches were observed, redirection to address staff missing the same areas during the pat was given. • Work crew ingress procedures were observed. The auditor noted inmates appeared to be accustomed to leaving their boxer shorts on during strip searches. They were reluctant to remove them. Indications are this is a common practice. • Inmates were observed carrying the escape fliers and hand delivering them to security staff. Searches: Marana• Search logs were reviewed. Search logs were present for the shift; however, searches were not logged in the Control Service Journal as required. • A review of the search logs was conducted. Two work crew logs are being utilized, one by the Operations Lieutenant and one that remains in the strip shack. These two logs did not reconcile. Keys: Marana - In compliance Tools: Marana• The Tool/Labor Pool Room is in compliance. Beginning and ending inventories were complete and accurate. • Class B tool area had razor wire installed on top of fence. Needs to be fully enclosed and hardened. This was suggested after the disturbance in February 2010 by SROD Sonberg. 16 • Kitchen Tool Accountability -A kitchen officer is not assigned. Tools are issued by food service staff. Supervisors check tools once per hour. Tool storage, master inventory and tool issue forms in compliance. Tools were cabled but were not secured during one review, corrected during follow up with the exception of the paddle which was not cabled or secured. . • Medical- in compliance. Sharps and tool inventories are being completed. • Plumbers Tool Box has over 30 tools in the box, none shadowed. Inventory present and accurate. • During tour of housing area during after hours, a toilet auger was found in a housing area next to a trash can. The inmate plumber came over and stated he was using it to unclog the drains. It was observed he was unescorted, further review noted the tool had not been checked out nor was an Information Report generated. Journals: Maraua - In compliance Phone Mouitoring: Marana - SSU advised they randomly monitor 10-15 calls per week. No log was available to review. Visitation: Marana • Strip logs in compliance and well organized. • Visitor Pass inventory was not accurate. Five passes are missing from the inventory. • Outside visitation area fence has razor wire bent away from building on west side comer. Next to the fence is a drain pipe that goes to the roof that could be used for climbing. Recommend adding razor wire to rooftop. Following is a summary ofthe team's findings for ASP-Phoenix West: Initial Tour: ASP-Phoenix West - The 1600 hour count was in process. Inmates were observed in their living areas. They were clearly accustomed to remaining at their bunks during count time. Officers were observed in the pods doing security checks and interacting with inmates. Assessment Team's Observation Summary: • The Warden and Assistant Warden of Operations were observed on the yard touring and talking to staff and inmates both days during our assessment. Command presence was observed by the team, inmates were respectful and compliant. The ADC monitor was on-site and was present during the assessment. • DO 704 is enforced regarding inmate dress outside of the housing unit. Inmates were observed in their boxers with t-shirts on while in the housing unit during the daytime hours. All inmates were wearing their ID cards as required. • Unit sanitation was excellent. All living areas were clean and orderly. Cleaning mops, brooms and squeegees were placed in the porter closets Floors were exceptionally clean. 17 • • • • • • • • • • Tour of the Kitchen and dining area noted serving utensils were cabled and secured. Evening dinner was observed and ran smoothly and quietly. Inmates are assigned seating based on their bunk number which corresponds to a number on each dining hall seat. This resulted in no attempts to racially segregate. Metal detectors at unit ingress and work crew return are set too high. All staff and inmates are unable to clear resulting in a wand scan being administered. This provides false sense of security as staff are not patted down if the wand goes off over the zipper area or other areas but were only being observed stating what it was that set off the scanner. Staff may introduce contraband in at those locations at claim it is their zipper. Inmates are stripped searched if the do not clear. Control room windows were observed without any bars or barriers beyond plexiglass that would prevent inmates from accessing them during an incident. With each control room providing keys and access for the entire unit, this safeguard is recommended. The Sweat Lodge is adjacent to the exterior perimeter. A hose was observed left attached to the water spigot. Immediately removed by a staff member. The lay down yard adjacent to the recreation field has multiple wire racks and other metal that could be used as weapons material. Fence is secured by one strand of razor wire. A ladder secured by a padlock in lay down yard can be propped against the building providing access to the roof of the recreation field entrance adjacent to the perimeter fence. Warden Thomas advised of the need to secure the ladder in a manner that does not allow it to be moved. The cable holding up the warning track curtain along the perimeter fence is similar to fence tie material and is susceptible to being cut down into weapons. The cable is loosely wire-tied to poles in the ground and is not painted or measured. Warden Thomas advised he would remove it. There are approximately 75 - 8'X2"X4" beams on the recreation field used for sand containment around recreation stations. These could easily be uprooted and used by inmates in a disturbance or as escape material. Warden advised and will remove. Observed an unsecured man hole on the recreation field that drops down 12 feet into a dry well. Bar needs to be welded across and padlocked. Could be used as a hiding place during recreation turn in. Warden advised. Staff uniforms are kept in a room secured above administration within the Unit. Inventory was unavailable for review. The room had a false ceiling which if this area was compromised, inmates could have access by climbing over the walls by accessing it through the ceiling tiles. Housing unit post orders were not present at all housing units. Alarm Zone System: Phoenix West - This is a minimum security facility housing inmates with substance abuse treatment needs. This facility does not have an alarm zone system and is comprised of a single fence without an inner or outer sand trap. Based on the location of this facility next to industrial buildings, the environment does not lend itself to traditional perimeters. Perimeter lighting is not motion sensor and is static. 18 • Emergency exits doors in the inmate housing areas were tested. A light illuminates in the control room. There is no alarm sounding if breached. Perimeter: Phoenix West• Perimeter checks are conducted twice per shift at the beginning and ending of each shift. • Perimeter lighting is adequate. • Perimeter challenge was conducted by placing an orange t-shirt on the perimeter fence on the west side of the unit. Staff conducting perimeter check observed the t-shirt and notified a supervisor who responded. The officer failed to immediately activate ICS upon discovery and the supervisor failed to direct him over the radio upon briefing of observation and halt all unit traffic. Emergency count was initiated upon the arrival of the supervisor to the area and all further protocols were followed. • Phoenix West does not have a perimeter road based on the facility design. • Signs and a barrier fence are present to control traffic into the institution. • Razor wire was observed to be stretched beyond recommended installation reducing the effectiveness. Recommend re-stringing based on manufacturer recommendations. Locations were west side offacility and between gates I and 2. • Trash receptacles too close to the fence line and could allow inmates to breach the fence and enter the parking lot. • Fence ties are "fish hook" type not "twist" type. No accounting system in place. • Roof hatch was secured with a padlock, recommend instaIling an alarm. Counts: Phoenix West - Formal counts were observed. The facility was found to be in compliance with policy. Formal count times are consistent with ADC established times. • The operational count process was excellent. Supervisors conducted the count and were observed reconciling the out counts with the Green Bar count sheets. • Consistent face to ID counts is conducted during formal C<;lunt. Armory: Phoenix West- An assessment of the armory procedures revealed the following discrepancies: • No regular use weapons, all weapons issued from the n.U.11Ul • Per DO 716.02.1.1 Weapons shall be stored Phoenix West has all of their We!lpOilS • shall inventory weapons at the beginning and ending of each shift and enter the inventory into the post correctional journal. Seal inventory at the beginning and ending of each shift. Actual weapon inventory is not conducted per policy. Inmate Movement: Phoenix West - Minimum custody does not require a controlled movement plan. 19 • • • The pod doors are secured after the yard closes at 2000 hours so that general population inmates cannot exit until the yard opens in the morning. Inmates assigned to detention are provided recreation at 2200 hours until 0000 hours. Phoenix West does not have any recreation enclosures and allows inmates assigned to detention to recreate on the large outside recreation field, outside visitation area and the enclosed area in between. Creates a staff and inmate safety issue with Level 5 inmates being escorted out, unrestrained then placed back into restraints without barriers. This creates an additional escape risk with Level 5 inmates being unsecured at night on large recreation. area. Warden Thomas advised they are planning to build recreation enclosures for this population to address this deficiency. Kitchen workers were observed being pat searched in Dorm 7 then turned out unescorted to the kitchen. Pat searches should occur at the entrance to the kitchen to ensure contraband is not retrieved prior to arrival. IngresslEgress: Phoenix West• Non-uniformed staff member provided ingress and egress check at main entrance during business hours and security staff during non-business hours. Inconsistent application was noticed as staff was allowed to take unauthorized items to a staff locker after they had been cleared to enter the facility. • Two of the team members were allowed to exit without showing proper ID. • Personal items placed on counter for introduction were not consistently searched. • Security challenge was conducted with Major Diaz introducing a double stacked Styrofoam cup into the unit with a pill box between the cups. The cups were not placed through the scanner and allowed in with contraband. • Work crew ingress was observed to be in compliance • Pat searches were observed, redirection to address staff missing the same areas during the pat was given. • Gate 4 was able to be breached with a comb due to the space in between the striker plate and lock. Warden Thomas advised and directed maintenance to address. • Female staff member observed entering and couId not clear the hand wand scan. Advised staff it was her wire bra and was allowed entrance into the unit without being pat searched. Searches: Phoenix West • Vehicle log not maintained in sally port, information radioed to Main Control for documentation. • Commissary truck arrived and neither the driver nor the' cab of the vehicle was searched. Driver was in contact with inmate workers unloading the vehicle allowing potential introduction of contraband into the unit. • Searches of inmate living areas observed and in compliance. • Inmates are tracked for being off site using a "V -gate" pass system. This is used at the vehicle gate to document time departing and time returning to the facility. The gate officer does not complete an inmate outcount form 701-3P for inmates 20 • on outcount nor is a 705-2 imnate movement Report form used for accountability. The only system used is the V -gate pass system. Boots for all off site imnate work crews are NOT "V'ed" .. Keys: Phoenix West• The shift lieutenant was observed in possession of key set that allowed him access to Main Control where his office is stationed. Warden Thomas advised and is removing the keyset from the lieutenant set. Only emergency keys shall access the Main Control. A Responder Only Keyset for a "Man Down" incident was previously established to access the Main Control however this system is being reviewed to ensure integrity and control of the keyset as a restricted set. • Phoenix West utilizes the Morse Keywatcher system which is coded with a fingerprint verification system. Letter of exception allowing authorization signed 2/12/08. Tools: Phoenix West• The tool room is not assigned a staff member. No check and balance system is in place to ensure tool accountability. Staff check out their own tools. • Maintenance staff was observed with a tool pouch that contained 8 tools. No inventory was present in the tool pouch. A box cutter was removed at 0800 in a security challenge staff and the maintenance staff member returned the tools without the missing the box cutter at 1015. It was not noted as missing. An ending inventory was not conducted. • Kitchen Tool Accountability - Kitchen officer assigned from 1100 hours to 1900 hours. • Doors into the kitchen were found unsecure during meal times. This was observed with imnates in the dining hall on two inspections. • Tool inventory incorrect for padlocks and plastic scoops. • Tools are cabled and locked when in use for meals. • Medical- in compliance. Sharps and tool inventories are being completed. Journals: Phoenix West - In compliance Phone Monitoring: Phoenix West - In compliance Visitation: Phoenix West• Minor discrepancies observed in AIMS entries. • Pat searches are completed prior to visitation and after. Imnates are not strip searched prior to departing the visitation area. Imnates are escorted in a group from visitation to a search area where they are ultimately strip searched. Reporting staff stated that they are rarely strip searched at visitation, however when there are sufficient staff, they have used the restrooms by visitation. 21