A federal district court in Delaware has held that a prisoner's claim of
proper dental treatment being delayed defeats the Defendant's Motion for
Dismissal. While incarcerated at Delaware's Multi-purpose Criminal Justice
Facility, prisoner David W. Williamson developed an abscessed tooth and
periodontal disease. Williamson went to the dental unit, run by Prison
Health Services (PHS), on several occasions and filed grievances with the
result of inadequate delayed treatment causing the loss of two teeth.

In late 1996, Williamson was treated for a cavity in his lower right rear
tooth #27, which he was told he needed rescheduling for extraction. As of
May 1998, Williamson still had not received treatment, and his condition
worsened. After seeing a dental assistant, Williams was told there was
nothing she could do," Williamson began filing grievances. As of July 14,
1999, Williamson still was awaiting permission from PHS to extract the
infected #8 and #29 teeth. He then filed suit.

PHS moved to dismiss the suit. The district court held where denial or
delay causes [a prisoner] to suffer a life-long handicap or permanent loss,
the medical need is serious." A serious medical need is one that has been
diagnosed by a physician as requiring ...

In a matter of first impression, the United States District Court for the
District of Rhode Island held that a federal pretrial detainee could pursue
a Bivens action against guards employed by a privately operated detention
facility.

Plaintiff George A. Sarro III was held in the privately operated Wyatt
Detention Center (WDC) while awaiting trial on federal criminal charges.
WDC, owned by Cornell Corrections, Inc., was under contract with the United
States Marshal Service to house federal pretrial detainees. While at WDC,
and after he had requested to be placed in protective custody, Sarro was
severely beaten by other detainees. Sarro alleged that after the beating he
was not given proper medical treatment.

Sarro brought action against Cornell and certain guards pursuant to Bivens
v. Six Unknown Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 91
S.Ct. 1999, 29 L.Ed.2d 619 (1971) and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 seeking monetary
damages for failure to protect him and for inadequate medical treatment in
violation of his Fifth and Eighth Amendment rights. Defendants moved for
dismissal and the motion was referred to a magistrate. The magistrate
recommended dismissal and Sarro filed objections.

The district court held: 1) Sarro could pursue Bivens ...

On June 23, 1993, a lawsuit arising from the suicide death of a prisoner in
the Jefferson County (Texas) Detention Center settled for $288,130. The
suit had alleged that STAT Care, the jail's contract medical provider,
failed to properly screen or provide mental health care to the decedent.
The decedent, ...

This case was before the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals for the second
time on a 42 U.S.C. §1983 action arising from the death, after a severe
asthma attack, of a Georgia prisoner. The first appeal, Howell v. Evans,
922 F. 2d 712 (11th Cir. 1991), affirmed the grant of qualified immunity to
attending physicians and Correctional Medical Services. However, the court
held the jury must determine if the superintendent should have known if the
prisoner needed proper treatment, been moved, or provided special care, and
whether the failure to do so constituted deliberate indifference.
After remand, a trial was held. The evidence included a memorandum
conveying the prisoner was in serious condition, and his diet and medical
needs could not be met at the combined prison/hospital. The Superintendent
testified he did not have authority to take action, but a "Medical
Organization Chart" depicted the Superintendent with top authority for
running the facility. The district court granted the Superintendent's
motion for judgment as a matter of law. The Eleventh Circuit held this to
be error, and remanded for a jury to determine the Superintendent's
responsibilities in running the facility. See: Howell v. Burden, 12 F. 3d
190 (11th Cir. 1994).

Third Circuit: PHS Subject to Successor Liability, Relation-Back Statute
Inapplicable

In this case involving a Title VII discrimination suit against Correctional
Physician Services (CPS), the U.S. Third Circuit Court of Appeals held that
the company's buyer, Prison Health Services (PHS), was subject to successor
liability and that the federal "relation-back" statute did not apply.

Noreen Brzozowski worked for CPS, a company that provided contract medical
services to prisoners, from 1991 until she was fired in 1996. In May 2000
she initiated a gender discrimination suit against the company under Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq. Unbeknownst
to Brzozowski, however, CPS had agreed in March 2000 to sell a substantial
amount of its assets to [PHS], an organization in a similar business." The
sales agreement disclaimed PHS's liability for certain lawsuits, and
specifically mentioned Brzozowski's discrimination claim. Further, under
the agreement, an "oversight committee" would be established to pay
creditors with $14 million in proceeds from the sale (the agreement further
stipulated that the committee would pay $1 million to Dr. Kenan Umar and
his son, who together owned 100% of CPS).

In a February 2001 deposition, Umar testified that CPS was ...

California Prisoner's Death From Untreated Tonsilitis Results In $725,000
Settlement


On March 30, 1999, California Forensic Medical Group (CFMG) and two
doctors agreed to pay a total of $725,000 to settle claims against them
arising from a prisoner's death due to untreated tonsilitis. CFMG is a
private company with a ...

On March 21, 2002, an unidentified plaintiff settled this medical
malpractice claim against two physicians for $2,500,000. At issue was the
medical treatment of a Riker's Island guard who suffered a heart attack in
front of the jail's infirmary.

Upon suffering bruises and contusions while suppressing a riot at the ...

The United States District Court for the District of Columbia held that a
former guard suing CCA of Tennessee under the District of Columbia Human
Rights Act (DCHRA) had not proven she was subjected to a hostile work
environment, that lack of promotion was discriminatory and that she was
qualified for promotion, or that she was retaliated against.

Plaintiff Nicole McCain was employed by CCA of Tennessee at the District of
Columbia Correctional Treatment Facility. McCain brought suit against CCA
under the DCHRA (D.C.Code §§ 1-2510 et seq.) alleging that she was denied a
promotion because she resisted sexual advances by a supervisor (Chief of
Security Larry Bynum) and that she was retaliated against for filing the
lawsuit. CCA moved for summary judgment.

The district court granted CCA's motion for summary judgment, holding: 1)
McCain's allegations that she was twice solicited for sex by Bynum was not
sufficient to support her claim of a hostile work environment. 2) The
warden, not Bynum, set the requirement of prior supervisory experience for
promotion. Thus, failure to promote McCain was not pretextual. 3) McCain
had not shown that she was qualified for the promotion, a requirement in
claims alleging gender discrimination. 4) McCain ...

The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York held
that Title VII procedural requirements mandate that a claimant obtain a
right-to-sue letter from the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC), but a right-to-sue letter is not necessary for actions brought
under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA).

Elease Canty, a former guard employed by Wackenhut Corrections Corporation,
brought action against her former employer under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 and the ADEA alleging gender, race, and age
discrimination after she was passed over for a promotion. Before filing
suit Canty filed a grievance with the EEOC but did not obtain a
right-to-sue letter. Defendants moved for dismissal alleging that Canty had
failed to exhaust her administrative remedies.

The district court denied the motion, holding: 1) Procedural requirements
for filing a Title VII action mandate that the claimant obtain a
right-to-sue letter from the EEOC. Since Canty had not obtained a
right-to-sue letter, her Title VII race and gender claims were dismissed.
2) The ADEA requires only that the claimant wait 60 days after filing a
complaint with the EEOC before filing suit. Thus, Canty's failure to obtain
a right-to-sue letter did not ...

The U.S. Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, affirming the U.S. District Court,
Western District of Washington, held that a prisoner failed to prove that
Washington prison officials were deliberately indifferent to his serious
medical needs when they treated him with anti-psychotic medication and
failed to diagnose a lung condition.

Paul L. Howard, a Washington state prisoner, sued the Clark County Jail,
Columbia River Mental Health Services, their employees, and officials of
the Washington Department of Corrections (DOC) under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and
the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 12132. Howard
claimed that while he was a pretrial detainee in the Clark County Jail in
1994 jail and mental health officials forcibly medicated him with
anti-psychotic drugs after misdiagnosing him as having a mental illness.
Howard also claimed that DOC officials continued to treat him with
anti-psychotic medications based on the misdiagnosed mental illness and
that, while he was being treated, officials failed to diagnose a lung
condition (unspecified in the opinion). The district court dismissed
Howard's claims against the jail and mental health services provider as
time-barred and granted summary judgment to prison officials. Howard appealed.

The Court of Appeals held that Howard's claims against the ...